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Stephen Utych, Boise State University
Elections are defining elements of democracy but occur infrequently. Given that elections evoke mass mobilization, we
expect citizen attachments to political parties to wax during election season and wane in between. By leveraging data
from 86 countries across the globe to investigate the effect of the electoral cycle on partisanship, we find that the
predicted probability of being close to a political party rises 6 percentage points from cycle midpoint to an election—an
effect rivaling traditional key determinants of partisanship. Further, fluctuations are larger where the persistence of
party presence throughout the cycle is weaker and socioeconomic development is lower. These findings challenge the
discipline to introduce dynamic political events into the study of partisanship, alongside “static” individual-level and
country-level determinants. Additionally, presumed cross-country or temporal differences in mass partisanship levels,
long used as indicators of democratic consolidation or party system institutionalization, may be confounded by
electoral cycle effects.
When will I see or hear from those political party people again? They just come around here making noise and giving t-shirts around the election
period. If I may say something, between elections, they just abandon us. What those MPs are actually doing there in Parliament, we do not know it.1
A lthough they are the most defining element of elec-toral democracies, national elections are few and farbetween. Every four years, on average,2 electoral com-
missions stage an event of epic proportions—producing mil-
lions of ballot papers, hiring and training an army of polling
station agents, and executing perhaps the country’s only nation-
wide event in which every citizen could theoretically partic-
ipate. During election season, a wide variety of actors mobi-
lize citizens. Political candidates and party elites, salivating in
anticipation of obtaining or retaining power, are incentivized
to reach out and mobilize the masses for political support,
whereas they otherwise shift attention to elite legislative pol-
itics (Box-Steffensmeier and Lin 1997; Fisher 1999; Horowitz
2012; Lindberg 2010; Wilkinson 2004). Interest groups ramp
up citizen mobilization efforts around elections given the added
leverage to extract policy from parties (Chandra 2012; Khemani
2004). Civil society movements use elections as focal points
for coordinating mass action (Tucker 2007). Since elections are
the apex of partisan group competition over policy direction
and societal resource allocation, such actors not only draw
citizens into politics around elections but also endeavor to mo-
bilize citizens to take sides into partisan camps through in-
person events and the mass media (Abney et al. 2013; Ander-
son 2003; Anderson, Tilley, and Heath 2005).
In this article, we argue that the cyclical nature of citizen
mobilization efforts over the electoral cycle affects the level
and intensity of mass partisanship. Higher levels of mobili-
zation around elections increase the relative influx of infor-
mation regarding party brands and partisan conflict (Brader
and Tucker 2008; Lupu 2013), as well as the net benefit of po-
litical participation in partisan activities (Khemani 2004; Lind-
berg 2010; Tucker 2007). Exposure to such information and
political participation are both well founded to engender and
reinforce partisanship (Brader and Tucker 2001; Dinas 2014;
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Greene 2004; Iyengar and Simon 2000; Valentino and Sears
1998). Finally, a well-known body of evidence has shown that
as group competition intensifies, individuals desire to take sides
and increase identification with their in-group, taking actions
to strengthen in-group cohesion or out-group hostility (e.g.,
Brewer and Kramer 1985; Choi and Bowles 2007; Tajfel 1981).
Applied to this setting, party competition alone may induce
individuals to become partisan or intensify existing partisan-
ship (Huddy 2013; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Taken
together, we hypothesize that partisanship waxes during elec-
tion season and wanes in between.
By constructing the widest cross-national data set on par-
tisanship to date, spanning 86 countries across Africa (2000–
2014), the Americas (2004–14), Asia (2001–12), and Europe
(2002–12), and pairing it with data on the dates of national
elections using the NELDA data set (Hyde and Marinov 2012),
we find that partisanship fluctuates, on average, a total of
12 percentage points over the electoral cycle—dropping 6 per-
centage points from an election to the cycle midpoint and
rising 6 percentage points up to the next election. The mag-
nitude of this effect rivals traditional key determinants of
partisanship in these data, such as being male (6 percentage
point increase), educated above the country mean level (6 per-
centage point increase), and age (4 percentage point increase
for each additional decade). The finding is robust to an ex-
amination of the intensity of closeness to a political party in
a subsample for which we have data: partisanship is more
intense at election time than in between. Given the statisti-
cal and substantive significance of these findings, we believe
that the discovery that the electoral cycle influences parti-
sanship represents a novel advance in one of the most well-
studied phenomena in political science.
We expound upon this finding in three ways. First, an
observable implication of the theoretical mechanism is that
fluctuations in partisanship should be larger where parties do
not have permanent community presence over the electoral
cycle. Indeed, we find evidence that fluctuations are much
larger where the permanence of party presence is weaker.
Second, we posit and test whether fluctuations in partisan-
ship over the electoral cycle are larger where the country level
of development is lower, democracy is younger, competitive-
ness is higher, voting is compulsory, the effective number of
parties is higher, the electoral system is more party-centric, and
the electoral cycle is longer. We find evidence that electoral
cycle fluctuations in partisanship are indeed larger in lower
income countries, as measured by the Human Development
Index, but find no support for other moderating effects. Last,
we collect data on the dates of nation-wide “second-order”
(subnational and supranational) elections. We find evidence
that partisanship fluctuates slightly more over the electoral cy-
cle when such elections are incorporated as qualifying elec-
tions in the cycle, a finding driven by subnational elections from
powerful subnational bodies.
This study provides an important advance in the study of
partisanship. We find that a dynamic factor—the position in
the electoral cycle—can influence whether and to what de-
gree individuals feel attached to political parties. By contrast,
existing scholarship has considered “static” individual, institu-
tional, and cultural determinants of partisanship (e.g., Brader
and Tucker 2008; Huber, Kernell, and Leoni 2005; Ishiyama
and Fox 2006) or the long-term stability in aggregate parti-
sanship in response to long-term political, economic, and so-
cial environmental change (Clarke and Stewart 1998; Dalton
and Wattenberg 2000).3 Additionally, while previous research
has tended to focus on country-specific or region-specific ex-
aminations of partisanship,4 with the vast majority of studies
concentrating on high-income countries,5 this study offers the-
ory and evidence that is so general as to be applicable to all
regimes with multiparty elections.
Uncovering the significance of the electoral cycle as a de-
terminant of partisanship is both normatively and empirically
important. Notably, partisanship determines and mutually re-
inforces a wide range of political behavior and opinions. As
Brader and Tucker sum up: “Partisanship is the central orga-
nizing principle of mass politics” (2008, 3). Scholars have found
partisanship not only to be highly associated with the pro-
pensity to vote and vote choice (e.g., Butler and Stokes 1963;
Campbell et al. 1960; Dinas 2014; Ishiyama and Fox 2006) but
also with other forms of political participation and engagement
(e.g., Fowler and Kam 2007; Gerber, Huber, and Washington
2010; Greene 2004; Huddy 2013; Huddy et al. 2015), as well as
political attitude formation (e.g., Lodge and Hamill 1986).
Given the salient role of partisanship, stable and high levels
of mass partisanship have been cited as the glue that attaches
citizens to elite politics in a democracy, allowing them input,
oversight, and a vehicle for participation in politics (Almond
and Verba 1963; Weisberg and Greene 2003). Our work has
shown that this glue dissolves over the years between the
3. Relatedly, those studying vote intention and turnout in second-order
elections have long noted that such behavior is affected by the position within
the first-order election cycle (e.g., Reif and Schmitt 1980) and even that such
second-order elections may affect behavior toward first-order politics (Bechtel
2012).
4. Huber et al.’s (2005) inter-regional investigation spanning Western
Europe and North America is a notable exception.
5. For Africa, see Ferree and Horowitz (2010), Harding and Michelitch
(2017), Ishiyama and Fox (2006), and Kuenzi and Lambright (2011). For Latin
America, see Lupu (2013), Medina et al. (2010), Perez-Linan (2002), and Sam-
uels (2006). For Eastern Europe, see Brader and Tucker (2001, 2008), Miller
and Klobucar (2000), and Rose and Mishler (1998). For Southern Europe, see
Gunther and Montero (2001) and Lisi (2014). And for Asia, see Sheng (2007).
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“cheap talk” of electoral campaigns—when the “real politics”
of legislating and implementing policy occur. Sagging parti-
sanship between elections—and with it political engagement—
can thus be seen as problematic for a well-functioning democ-
racy in terms of a weakening citizen-state connection for many
years between elections. As the opening quote suggests, cit-
izens can feel “abandoned” by national politics outside of
elections when politicians no longer need citizens’ votes (Lind-
berg 2010). Indeed, depressed citizen engagement between
elections has been well noted to mutually reinforce political
business cycle dynamics, in which government is much more
responsiveness around elections (Golden and Min 2013). That
the present study found electoral cycle fluctuations in parti-
sanship to be much larger in low-income countries is consis-
tent with Shi and Svensson’s (2006) finding that the political
business cycle is stronger in such contexts.
On the other hand, fluctuations in partisanship over the
electoral cycle may be beneficial. For one, partisanship biases
attitude formation and the consumption and perception of
political news media (e.g., Bartels 2002), as well as attribution
of blame for political failure (e.g., Malhotra 2008). Having a
less-biased citizenry between elections may help citizens more
clearly evaluate government performance or consider and in-
corporate new ideas—allowing citizens to hold government
actors more accountable. The presence and intensity of par-
tisanship is also linked to higher levels of societal polariza-
tion (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and discrimination
between citizens on partisan lines across diverse settings in
ostensibly nonpolitical activities (Carlin and Love 2013; Fowler
and Kam 2007; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Moreso, elec-
tions have been shown to exacerbate interpartisan discrimi-
nation in ordinary, real-life economic activities (Michelitch
2015) and correlate with increased political violence (Dun-
ning 2011). Such authors may view sustained “election levels”
of partisanship throughout the electoral cycle as a danger to
the well-being of society in terms of national unity.
Last, levels of partisanship are often compared cross-
nationally as an indicator of party system institutionalization
(Dalton and Weldon 2007; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007) and
democratic consolidation (Brader and Tucker 2001; Converse
1969). This work has shown that electoral cycle effects are quite
large in magnitude, implying that cases of presumed cross-
national differences in mass partisanship levels (e.g., Ishiyama
and Fox 2006; Keefer 2010; Lisi 2014; Pereira 2012; Sheng
2007), as well as over-time differences in mass partisanship
levels within a country (e.g., Schickler and Green 1997), may
be confounded by election cycle effects.6 We suggest that, to
the extent possible, public opinion surveys could consider keep-
ing the timing of survey data collection consistent during the
electoral cycle so as to facilitate within-country over-time and
cross-national comparisons of partisanship and other mea-
sures affected by the electoral cycle.
THEORY
Partisanship has been conceptualized in comparative poli-
tics scholarship as when an individual “feels close to a political
party” (Brader and Tucker 2008; Huber et al. 2005; Ishiyama
and Fox 2006). Importantly, this study focuses on partisan-
ship toward any party whatsoever and not the more well-
studied phenomenon of partisanship type—allegiance toward
one party over another (see discussion and review in Johnston
[2006]). Thus far, partisanship presence has been found cross-
nationally to be determined by both individual traits (e.g.,
gender, education, age, urban/rural status), country-level insti-
tutional factors (e.g., clarity of responsibility), or an interac-
tion between the two (Huber et al. 2005). In addition to these
“static” factors, researchers have examined long-term change in
partisanship presence over decades due to macrolevel changes
in society (e.g., Clarke and Stewart 1998; Dalton and Watten-
berg 2000). In this article, we seek to expand upon these veins
of scholarship to include a dynamic determinant of partisan-
ship: the electoral cycle.
As an 86-country study, this article seeks to provide as
broad a theoretical and empirical treatment of the effect of
the electoral cycle on partisanship as possible, given the data
available. Our arguments apply to any regimes holding multi-
party elections, whether they be new or old democracies, com-
petitive or noncompetitive, or characterized by various styles
of campaigning. Like others taking a cross-national approach,
we remain agnostic about the “pathways to partisanship” (Brader
and Tucker 2008) as being a social psychological attachment
to a party as a social group (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse
1969; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Greene 2004), a
running tally of parties’ performance information (Achen 2002),
or both (Fiorina 1981).
Importantly, our central arguments in this article are rel-
evant to both perspectives, and we draw from both to theorize
the relationship between the electoral cycle and partisanship.
Both perspectives underscore the stability of partisanship
type, that is to say, that individuals do not typically switch
allegiance between parties without major shifts in the party
landscape. However, both perspectives allow for changes in
partisanship presence and intensity. The running tally per-
6. Surveys that hold proximity to an election relatively constant (e.g.,
election studies such as the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) would
not face this potential omitted variable. Unfortunately, election studies are
scarce in the developing world and researchers therefore can rely more
heavily if not exclusively on the public opinion barometers.
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spective, for example, holds that citizens engage in Bayesian
updating with respect to expected future benefits from a party
(Achen 2002) or retrospective party evaluations (Fiorina 1981).
As individuals receive more information about party fit in the
short or medium term, they update their closeness to the
party. On the other hand, the social psychological theory of
partisanship as a social group identity would hold that the
intensity (also called salience or strength) of group identity
could fluctuate in the short-term due to in-group mobili-
zation efforts and/or intergroup competition (Brewer and
Kramer 1985; Huddy 2013; Huddy et al. 2015; Tajfel 1981).
In line with these theories, we expect individuals’ partisan-
ship to wax and wane in presence and intensity over the
course of the electoral cycle.
Electoral cycle fluctuations in citizen mobilization
We expect that the temporal proximity to an election in-
creases partisanship for multiple reasons. First, elections cat-
alyze an increase in partisan mobilization of citizens (Box-
Steffensmeier and Lin 1997; Fisher 1999; Horowitz 2012;
Lindberg 2010; Plasser and Plasser 2002; Tucker 2007; Wil-
kinson 2004).7 As party elites and their candidates anticipate
the prospect of obtaining or retaining political power leading
up to an election, they hit the campaign trail to mobilize
citizens. Partisan mobilization efforts from political parties
are lower during the midpoint of the electoral cycle and in-
crease during “campaign season” as the next election draws
near, lingering afterward during any disputes or protests
over election results (Tucker 2007; Wilkinson 2004), coali-
tion formation (Fisher 1999), or distributions of patronage
(Lindberg 2010). In some instances, parties may completely
disappear outside of elections, as the opening quote of this
article suggests. Local offices, staff, and candidates may pack
up and head back to the capital, and funds deplete for “party
boys” to blast campaign messages from speakers strapped to
slow-moving vehicles. In other instances, parties may main-
tain more of a permanent presence in local communities,
holding party meetings, sponsoring soccer clubs, conducting
outreach, providing information about efforts to achieve par-
tisan goals, or otherwise making themselves available for cit-
izen complaints or requests. However, even in such cases,
parties shift resources from citizen mobilization to routine
expenditure on organizational operations, assistance in leg-
islative and executive governing, and fund-raising outside of
election season (Box-Steffensmeier and Lin 1997; Plasser and
Plasser 2002).
Concurrent with party mobilization of citizens, “interest
groups” (e.g., ethnic groups, business associations, and civil
society groups) play an active role in mobilizing citizens to
partisan sides at election time (Chandra 2012; Green and
Gerber 2008; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Of course, such
interest groups conduct important activities throughout the
electoral cycle (e.g., lobbying political officials around law
making and implementation, holding meetings and events).
However, elections represent a key time of leverage to extract
policy from politicians in exchange for “electoral resources”
such as votes or campaign donations (Khemani 2004). Thus,
citizen mobilization efforts by interest groups are much more
active at election time to marshall such electoral resources
(Anzia 2011).
Last, elections may act as focal points for coordinating
partisan political participation in the form of civil society
movements (Tucker 2007). Not only can citizen movements,
like interest groups, take advantage of the political competi-
tion to capture domestic and international attention and gain
leverage over political elites, but elections make a convenient
rallying point to coordinate collective organization. For ex-
ample, by revealing a growing level of popular discontent with
major fraud by an incumbent party, elections may spark im-
mediate post-election citizen mobilization (Little, Tucker, and
LaGatta 2015; Tucker 2007). Citizens throughout the country
receive a relatively simultaneous signal, and there is a lim-
ited time frame to resolve the issue before the incumbent
party takes office.
The effect of citizen mobilization on partisanship
There are two major and well-demonstrated pathways through
which partisan mobilization efforts may increase citizens’ par-
tisanship: (1) through an influx of partisan campaign infor-
mation and (2) by increasing the net benefit of political par-
ticipation.
An influx of partisan campaign information. One of the
most intuitive pathways through which such campaigning
strengthens citizen partisanship is through an influx of par-
tisan campaign information, and citizen attention to it (Abney
et al. 2013; Anderson 2003; Anderson et al. 2005; Bechtel
2012). Citizens can be exposed to partisan campaign infor-
mation bymobilizing actors in-person—through tours (Jourde
2005), rallies (Horowitz 2012), quid pro quo clientelist rela-
tions (Hicken 2011), or informally through social networks
(Sinclair 2012). They can also be exposed through mass me-
dia (e.g., television, radio, newspapers, the internet), either
by the procurement of advertising space by mobilizing agents,
or by independent coverage of the election by journalists
(Strömbäck and Kaid 2009). Campaigns thus “subsidize” in-
7. Further, government spending increases ahead of elections (Golden
and Min 2013), which might be seen as an implicit form of incumbent
campaigning even in electoral authoritarian regimes (Pepinsky 2007).
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formation costs for citizens (Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein
2004).
Much of this information emphasizes “party brands,”
characterizing for what and whom parties stand at election
time (Lupu 2013), as well as valence issues (e.g., integrity,
competence; Abney et al. 2013). According to theorists of
partisanship, such information allows citizens to “update”
their fit with political parties (Iyengar and Simon 2000), and
partisanship strengthens (Brader and Tucker 2008; Lupu
2013). Because campaigns and the media seek to organize
political conflict on partisan lines to mobilize citizens (Freed-
man et al. 2004; Schattschneider 1960), it follows that in-
creased exposure to party brand information strengthens par-
tisan divisions and persuades citizens to take sides (Brader and
Tucker 2008; Greene 2004; Valentino and Sears 1998). Often,
competition is framed as a shared quest for candidates and
their supporters to use their symbiotic relationship to gain
access to state resources and policy control versus opposing
candidates and their supporters (Lindberg 2010; Michelitch
2015). Indeed, citizens often select into self-confirming par-
tisan media, thereby reinforcing partisanship (Iyengar and
Simon 2000).
Party loyalties could also be reinvigorated during cam-
paigning through an agenda-setting effect. Exposure to party
competition increases its accessibility in the minds of citizens
and the importance of partisanship for citizens’ attitudes and
behaviors (Iyengar and Simon 2000; McCombs and Shaw
1972; Scheufele 2000).8 Elections may further increase incen-
tives to seek exposure to campaign information to become
informed in anticipation of voting or other political partici-
pation, perhaps because the utility of such participation in-
creases when one is informed (Shineman 2013).
An increase in the net benefit of political participation.
Not only do campaigns “subsidize” information costs for
citizens, but they also subsidize the cost and raise the benefit
of political participation. Mobilizing actors from parties, in-
terest groups, and civil society make available and solicit par-
ticipation in activities such as rallies, neighborhood or town-
hall meetings, appearances at prominent businesses, religious
services, markets, or civil society groups, voter-registration
drives, and other culturally specific local events (see, e.g.,
Chandra 2012; Horowitz 2012; Jourde 2005; Lindberg 2010).
In addition to explicitly partisan mobilization, some civil
society groups simply endeavor to promote political partici-
pation at election time for its own sake—such “get out the
vote” campaigns aim specifically to lower the cost of regis-
tering to vote or increase the cost of not voting by evoking
civic duty or social pressure (Green and Gerber 2008). Be-
tween elections, such widespread opportunities may not be
available, especially where parties are not particularly em-
bedded in local communities. Interacting with a party offi-
cial between elections is often costly and difficult.
Citizens expect to receive both experiential and, in many
cases, material benefits through political participation during
election season (Hicken 2011; Lindberg 2010). There are two
types of material benefits citizens in some countries might
expect. First, they may expect cash or in-kind goods at elec-
tion campaign events—t-shirts, sugar, soap, rice, stickers, yard
signs, bands, dancing, football matches, and so forth—much
like one expects to consume drinks, snacks, and entertain-
ment at a party. Second, citizens may expect if they partici-
pate as good partisans by supporting candidates at rallies,
meetings, and at the polls, they will be rewarded by favorable
access to state resources or policy if the party they support
wins the election. Outside of election season, political par-
ticipation may not be rewarded with such a high amount of
benefits because the benefits have been exhausted at election
time and citizens lose leverage over the parties (Chandra 2012;
Khemani 2004).
The positive correlation and mutual reinforcement be-
tween partisanship strength and political participation is a
well-known empirical regularity with strong psychological
foundations (Brader and Tucker 2001; Campbell et al. 1960;
Dinas 2014; Fowler and Kam 2007; Greene 2004; Huddy
et al. 2015; Plasser and Plasser 2002). Behavioral choices
supporting a party, especially repetitive choices, result in a
sense of commitment and loyalty, intensifying partisanship
(Brader and Tucker 2001; Dinas 2014). This reinforcement
may reduce cognitive dissonance, in which individuals seek
conformity between behavior, identity, and attitudes (Dinas
2014; Festinger 1957). Thus, repetitive acts can lead to “esca-
lating commitments” toward an identity (Benabou and Tirole
2006). Internally, such acts are “self-signals” to one’s self-
concept of identity. Visible acts of support—wearing t-shirts,
staking yard signs, flying flags, attaching bumper stickers—
remind others of one’s loyalty, reinforcing identity externally.
In turn, stronger partisanship reinforces political participa-
tion (Fowler and Kam 2007; Gerber et al. 2010; Greene 2004;
Huddy 2013; Huddy et al. 2015). When groups are engaged
in competition, individuals can desire to increase the status
and welfare of their group at the expense of other groups,
which tends to blur the lines between group utility and in-
dividual utility, and perceive costs of political participation
to further group interests to be lower (Brewer and Kramer
1985).
8. Exposure to party brands may be nonvoluntary by observing bill-
boards, overhearing radio blasted in open air markets, or driving behind a
car with aggressive partisan bumper stickers.
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Intergroup competition and group identity salience
Last, there may be deeper psychological mechanisms through
which elections draw citizens closer to political parties. Tem-
poral proximity to group competition, especially high-stakes
competition over societal resources, is known to increase in-
dividuals’ desire to take sides on group lines in that compe-
tition, as well as strengthen in-group cohesion and out-group
hostility (Brewer and Kramer 1985; Tajfel 1981). Indeed,
some believe it may be central to the fundamental nature of
group competition, even dating back to prehistorical times,
for humans to attach themselves to groups in times of com-
petition for leadership or control of resources (Choi and
Bowles 2007). Such a fundamental psychological effect of
electoral competition between parties may therefore rein-
force participation, exposure to information, and partisan
identity.
Summary and hypotheses
In sum, we argue that elections induce a rise in citizen
mobilization by parties, interest groups, and civil society
movements to take partisan sides, which wanes in between.
Higher levels of campaigning increase partisanship through
an influx of political information regarding party brands and
partisan conflict, an increase in the net benefit of political
participation, and perhaps even a psychological anticipation
of partisan group competition. Gains in partisanship may
mutually reinforce increases in political participation, ex-
posure to political information, and group cohesion. We do
recognize that each country—and election—is unique. In-
deed, the exact “bundle” of activities and actors mobilizing
citizens at election time, and the strength of different path-
ways connecting such activities to partisanship, is likely to
vary cross-nationally and over time. This article posits that,
despite such differences, a very general relationship may exist
between the electoral cycle and partisanship.
While much campaign hype occurs in the lead-up to an
election, it is important to remember that it does not in-
stantly cease after election day. Lengthy waiting times to
count ballots, protest and contestation of results or fraud,
and coalition formation mean that citizen mobilization often
lasts for quite lengthy time periods after an election (Fisher
1999; Little et al. 2015; Tucker 2007). Media coverage of the
winner and loser continues to report on party reactions.
Furthermore, once people have participated in an election,
they may continue to experience a boost in partisanship di-
rectly afterward. Dinas (2014), for example, underscores this
post-election increase in partisan salience due to the act of
casting a ballot: “party identification is strengthened when
individuals convert a partisan identity or leaning into a be-
havioral choice through the act of voting.” Indeed, it is well
demonstrated that “post-electoral euphoria” increases polit-
ical engagement directly subsequent to major elections.9
Figure 1 depicts a stylized version of our hypothesized
relationship between the electoral cycle and partisanship.
Partisanship descends moving away from the last election as
campaigning wanes and ascends toward the next election as
campaigning waxes. Although figure 1 depicts a symmetric
relationship before and after an election for simplicity, we
wish to emphasize that fluctuations may certainly be asym-
metric—partisanship may drop off quickly after an election
and increase slowly and steadily as the next election draws
near, or vice versa. We do not have a strong hypothesis as
to the exact slope and shape of the quadratic relationship in
this cross-national study.
RESEARCH DESIGN
To test our primary hypothesis that citizens’ partisanship
increases as elections are more proximate, we merge large
cross-national surveys from regional barometers. We lever-
age 464,171 respondents from 86 countries’ cross-national
barometer surveys in Africa (Afro Barometer 2000, rounds 1–
5; http://www.afrobarometer.org), the Americas (Americas
Barometer 2004, rounds 1–5, by the Latin American Public
Opinion Project; http://www.LapopSurveys.org), Asia (Asia
Barometer, rounds 1–3), and Europe (European Social Sur-
vey 2012, rounds 1–5), as well as election dates and features of
Figure 1. Electoral cycle effects on partisanship. We hypothesize that parti-
sanship waxes toward elections and wanes after, as depicted in this stylized
symmetrical illustration.
9. Specifically, scholars (e.g., Reif and Schmitt 1980) have found that
proximity to “first-order” (major) elections carries over into behavior—
such as increased turnout—in “second-order” (minor, such as European
Parliament or regional) elections that are positioned shortly after the first-
order elections in the first-order election cycle. However, when such
second-order elections occur more distantly during the first-order election
cycle (long after such euphoria has depleted), turnout is much lower in
second-order elections.
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elections from our own research and the NELDA data set
version 3 (Hyde and Marinov 2012).10
Our main dependent variable, Partisanship, is measured
by the question “Do you feel close to a political party?” with
response options “yesp 1/nop 0” in these data sets.11 In a
subset of country-rounds, respondents can state the answer
to “How close?” with response options “not very close, some-
what close, and very close.” Where included, we can addi-
tionally examine Partisanship Closeness, coded as 0 if not
partisan, 1 if not very close, 2 if somewhat close, and 3 if very
close.12
Operationalizing the electoral cycle is a bit tricky, given
that electoral cycles vary in length and electoral rules vary
widely across countries. We thus measure a respondent’s
position in the electoral cycle between the last election and
the next election as the percentage of time passed between
the two, calling this variable Proximity. Increasing values
indicate increasing temporal proximity to the next election.
For example, 0 is the day after an election has taken place,
.5 is halfway through the cycle, and 1 is the day of an
election. In the main analysis, we consider national elec-
tions for president or legislature, designating the last elec-
tion to be the last voting experience, and next election to be
the next voting experience to create the cycle.13
Further, we hypothesize that the effect of the election cy-
cle on partisanship will be nonlinear—a U-curve with the
salience being the lowest when the elections are furthest away.
Thus, we utilize the term Proximity2 along with Proximity to
allow for such a quadratic form. This modeling choice is sub-
stantiated by observing the relationship between Partisanship
and Proximity via a Lowess regression, a nonparametric lo-
cally weighted scatterplot smoothing regression (see app. 3.1;
appendix available online).
The focus of this article is on the effect of the electoral
cycle on partisanship. Because the electoral cycle can be rea-
sonably taken as exogenous to other determinants of parti-
sanship, it is not necessary to control for other determinants.14
However, the including known individual level predictors
of partisanship allows us to improve statistical efficiency and
compare the effect of the electoral cycle to standard bench-
marks. We therefore include individual-level demographics
that have been demonstrated to be causes and not conse-
quences of partisanship. Female is an indicator variable coded
as 1 for females and 0 for males. Urban is an indicator var-
iable coded as 1 for urban residents and 0 for rural residents.
Age is a continuous measure of respondent age. Educated is
an indicator variable for whether a respondent is above the
median education level within his/her country, or below.
We model each individual i living in country c at time t
as having a level of partisanship Yict:
Yictp g1Proximityct 1 g2Proximity
2
ct
1X0 ictb1 S0f1 ϵict:
ð1Þ
The vector Xict contains individual-level variables. We in-
clude country fixed-effects to control for unmeasured country-
level effects, given by a vector of country indicator variables
S0.15 Last, ϵict is unobserved/unmodeled determinants of in-
dividual i’s partisanship.16 We use logistic regression to esti-
10. Afro Barometer countries include Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Americas Barometer countries include Argentina,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago,
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Asian Barometer countries include
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Phillippines, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. European Social Survey countries include Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. We leave
out countries that have only had 1 round of surveys, because there would
be no good counterfactual along the election cycle for such countries. We
include future scheduled elections where possible. Arab Barometer has no
partisanship question.
11. We recognize that the standard comparative politics survey ques-
tion may capture different notions of partisanship across countries, ranging
from ideological proximity to clientelistic linkages, to contact with politi-
cal party actors. Changes over the cycle thus might reflect fluctuations in
ideological proximity, clientelistic linkages, or contact with political party
actors. Such a question may further be interpreted differently across indi-
viduals, language translations, or over time. Future work should examine
change in the meaning of this question across individuals and countries to
ensure consistency of the measure. In this investigation, we find it inter-
esting that closeness to a political party—however defined—waxes and wanes
over the electoral cycle.
12. The follow-up question was not asked in the Americas Barometer
or on rounds 1, 2, and 5 for the Afro Barometer.
13. Thus, if the last election had two rounds of voting due to a runoff
election, the last election date would be the runoff. If the next election had
two rounds of voting due to a runoff election, the next election date would
be the first round of voting.
14. We do not know of a control variable that causes both election
timing and levels of partisanship.
15. Including country fixed effects in the analysis allows each country
to have its own intercept, thereby removing country level effects that could
confound results if left uncontrolled.
16. We further note that Proximityct and Proximity 2ct , where we have
respondents’ interview dates for surveys, would be Proximityict and
Proximity 2ict . Otherwise they are the median date in which the survey was
fielded. Mostly surveys are fielded over a span of a few weeks to maximally
a few months, and therefore this should make little difference in a cycle of
many years in this type of large-scale cross-national regressions framework.
418 / Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship Kristin Michelitch and Stephen Utych
mate the odds of having Partisanship, given that it is a bi-
nary outcome variable. With the ordinal Partisanship Closeness
outcome variable, we use an ordered logistic regression. In
order to weight each country survey round equally, each ob-
servation is weighted by 1/(number of observations from that
country round). Standard errors are clustered at the country-
round level to capture nonindependence in answers for each
country-round.
We present descriptive statistics for Proximity in appen-
dix 1.3 and for the main dependent variables—Partisanship
and Partisanship Closeness in appendix 1.1. Appendix fig-
ure 3 reveals that there is good variation in the electoral cycle
in the data set: surveys were conducted throughout the cycle,
with a median of 50% of the way through.17 We also have
ample variation in the two dependent variables. Interest-
ingly, the world is almost evenly split when all citizens in the
sample are pooled: 49% are partisan and 51% are not. In
examining the spread of the closeness in the subset of ob-
servations for which we have data, 12% of all respondents are
very close, while 28% are somewhat close, and 12% are not
very close. Thus, of the individuals who are close to a political
party, the majority are “somewhat close.”18
RESULTS
The results support our hypothesis that the electoral cycle
influences partisanship. Model 1 of table 1 reveals the results
of a logistic regression of partisanship on proximity to an
election across 86 countries. As we predicted, partisanship
fluctuates quadratically over the electoral cycle. Figure 2 de-
picts the relationship graphically; the fluctuation in the pre-
dicted probability of being close to a political party takes a
quadratic U shaped form, with partisanship dipping to its
lowest near the midpoint of the electoral cycle. The pre-
dicted probability of being close to a political party is roughly
.54 in the first and last quintile of the cycle, while the mini-
mum is in the middle (fifth) quintile at .48. This is a total
absolute change over the cycle of 12 percentage points. For
the interested reader, appendix 2 contains a graph of the mar-
ginal effect of the position in the electoral cycle on the proba-
bility of partisanship.
The substantive magnitude of this result rivals that of
common determinants of partisanship. In this sample of coun-
tries, we can compare the effect of the electoral cycle to the
individual level determinants of partisanship. Being male
and having greater than country mean level of education, for
example, is each associated with a 6 percentage point increase
in the predicted probability of partisanship. Thus, a counter-
factual sex change from female to male or counterfactually
achieving relatively higher education is equivalent to moving
from the midpoint of the electoral cycle to an election. Last,
age is associated with partisanship—for each additional de-
cade of life, there is a 4 percentage point increase in the pre-
dicted probability of partisanship. Thus, counterfactually aging
by 15 years is equivalent to moving from the midpoint of the
electoral cycle to an election.
The results of the more continuous measure of parti-
sanship intensity (for which only a subsample of countries
have data) complement the findings with the dichotomous
17. See also a histogram showing the number of survey rounds per
country in app. 1.4. The modal number of surveys per country is 5 rounds.
We exclude countries for which only one survey has taken place (for which
there is no counterfactual data collection collected otherwise in the electoral
cycle).
18. A violin plot in app. 1.2 depicts wide variation in the percentage
partisan in each survey.
Table 1. Proximity to an Election and the Presence and
Intensity of Partisanship
Model 1:
Partisanship
Model 2: Partisanship
Closeness
Electoral proximity 21.20*** 2.96**
(.376) (.435)
Electoral proximity2 1.13*** .90**
(.356) (.449)
Female 2.26*** 2.24***
(.011) (.015)
Age .02*** .02***
(.001) (.001)
Urban 2.08*** 2.03
(.019) (.022)
Educated .23*** .25***
(.020) (.026)
Cutpoint 1 2.24
(.321)
Cutpoint 2 .30
(.320)
Cutpoint 3 1.98***
(.325)
Observations 464,171 291,449
Country rounds 293 184
Countries 86 59
Note. Model 1 is logistic regression results whereby the dependent vari-
able is Partisanship (1 p close to a political party, 0 p not). Model 2 is
ordered logistic regression results whereby the dependent variable is
strength of attachment to a political party (ranging from 0 to 3). In both
models, standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country-survey
round level, and observations weighted by 1/(number of observations from
country round). Country fixed-effects not depicted for brevity.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
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measure of partisanship (table 1, model 2). Given the poor
readability yielded by graphing the predicted probabilities
of four categories across the electoral cycle, we report the pre-
dicted probabilities and fluctuations in tabular form. Draw-
ing attention to table 2, we find that the “very close” and
“somewhat close” categories boost at election time, fluctu-
ating by 5 and 7 percentage points over the cycle in absolute
terms. There is no change over the cycle in the proportion
of individuals predicted as “not very close.” Commensurate
to the gains in the somewhat and very close categories, the
number of nonpartisans fluctuates a total of 11 percentage
points over the cycle, with the number being higher at the
cycle midpoint than close to an election. That is, as elections
become more proximate, individuals are less likely to identify
as nonpartisan and more likely to identify as at least some-
what strong partisans.
The results are robust to numerous robustness checks
(see app. 3). First, the results are robust to multi-level mod-
eling, a different statistical approach to analyze these effects
(app. 3.2). Second, the results are robust to alternative weight-
ings of individual observations (app. 3.3): (a) no weights,
(b) survey and country population weights, (c) survey and sur-
vey round weights, (d) only round weights, and (e) survey,
survey round, and population weights. These robustness checks
ensure that the result is not driven by particular countries that
havemore data or a smaller population.19 Third, the results are
robust to the inclusion of countries for which at least three
or more, four or more, or five or more survey rounds exists,
given the increasing number of counterfactual positions along
the electoral cycle from countries with a larger number of
rounds (app. 3.4).20 Fourth, the results are robust to dropping
elections in which the de jure timing was not de facto re-
spected, in case of any possible endogeneity (app. 3.5). Fifth,
while election timing in presidential systems is fixed and exog-
enous to levels of political participation due to other fac-
tors, elections may be called in parliamentary systems, raising
questions of potential endogeneity in the latter. The literature
on calling parliamentary elections, however, shows that elec-
tions are called when the incumbent believes that it is per-
forming well (i.e., the distribution of partisan type is favorable
to the incumbent) andmight not perform as well in the future
(e.g., due to economic shocks), not when overall levels of par-
tisanship for any party whatsoever are higher (Smith 1996).
Nonetheless, we show the results are robust to dropping coun-
tries for which elections may be called off a fixed term, by le-
veraging the V-dem variable v2exdfdshs_ord (app. 3.6). Last,
we find robustness of the results to examining only presi-
dential elections as qualifying elections in presidential sys-
tems; that is, dropping legislative elections (app. 3.7).
EXTENSIONS
We have found robust support that the electoral cycle is a
major determinant of partisanship cross-nationally: partisan-
ship waxes around elections and wanes in between. We ex-
pound upon this finding in three ways. First, an observable
implication of the theoretical argument is that fluctuations in
partisanship should be larger where parties have less perma-
nent presence to mobilize the citizenry over the electoral cycle.
Second, we posit and test whether fluctuations in partisan-
ship over the electoral cycle are moderated by a range of
country-level factors. Last, we examine whether findings are
flattened or amplified when “second-order” elections are in-
corporated.
19. Interestingly, the magnitude of the total fluctuation varies ac-
cording to the different weighting schemes. When no weights are applied,
fluctuations change an absolute value of 13 percentage points, while when
survey and country population weights are applied, fluctuations amount to
25 percentage points, survey and survey round weights 14 percentage
Figure 2. Predicted probability of partisanship over the electoral cycle. On the
x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle from the last election
(0) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the predicted probability of
identifying as partisan.
points, only round weights 13 percentage points, and all three 34 per-
centage points. In the main analysis, we use the standard survey weights:
1/(number of observations from country round). Larger effects when more
populous countries being able to “count more” thus seem to show effect
sizes to be much larger. Since 86 countries do not represent all countries,
we do not make inferences to the global population, however.
20. If there were only one survey conducted per country, for example,
this would be concerning because a “bad draw” could yield that high
partisanship countries happen to be surveyed around elections and low
partisan countries happen to be surveyed outside of election season. We
are confident in the results because of the ample variation in the electoral
cycle cross-nationally and a large swath of countries for which we have
many surveys at varying times during the electoral cycle, but these ro-
bustness checks provide further confirmation.
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The permanence of party presence
If our theory is correct, one observable implication is that
when the fluctuation in partisan mobilization activities is
greater across the electoral cycle, the fluctuation in partisan-
ship should also be greater. While time-series data on par-
tisan mobilization efforts do not exist for any country, much
less all 86 countries in our data set, Kitschelt’s (2013) Dem-
ocratic Accountability and Citizen-Politician Linkages Project
(DALP) has collected data in a large swath of the 86 coun-
tries on the permanence of political party presence in com-
munities over the electoral cycle.
Parties are perhaps the actor most responsible for mobi-
lizing citizens. With more permanent party presence in local
communities throughout the electoral cycle, parties may be
able to maintain more active linkages to citizens that would
act to increase exposure to party brand information and lower
the cost (raise the net benefit) of participating in partisan
politics in between elections. Where parties have permanent
offices and paid staff, they often hold regular meetings, conduct
community service and outreach, liaise with interest groups,
and sponsor youth sports teams or women’s associations. Per-
manent offices and paid staff also ensures a higher degree of
availability for citizens to bring complaints or requests during
the electoral cycle. By contrast, where parties’ local presence
with voters is fleeting and centered only on the election season,
the contrast may be much starker in the level of opportunity
to participate in partisan politics, contact politicians, or be ex-
posed to party brand information inside and outside election
season. Thus, consistent with this theoretical mechanism, we
posit that where parties maintain less permanent presence in
local communities, fluctuations in partisanship may be larger
than where parties maintain a higher degree of permanent
presence in local communities.
In Kitschelt’s (2013) data set, expert coders respond for
each party in a country: “Do the following parties or their
individual candidates maintain offices and paid staff at the
local or municipal-level? If yes, are these offices and staff per-
manent or only during national elections?” The data are cross-
sectional and were collected in 2008 and 2009, which is for-
tunately in the middle of our study time period. We recode
the experts’ responses in increasing order of permanence:
0 p no permanent offices, 1p the party maintains local of-
fices only during national elections, 2 p the party maintains
permanent local offices in some districts, and 3 p the party
maintains permanent party offices in most districts. Given that
multiple coders coded each party, we next calculated an av-
erage score for each party.21 Finally, we take a weighted av-
erage of the party scores based on party vote share (provided
in the DALP data set). Thus, the operationalization is meant
to capture the overall atmosphere of party presence in a coun-
try.22 Figure 7 in appendix 4 displays a violin plot of our mea-
sure of Party Permanence, showing good variation cross-
nationally.
We estimate a logistic regression interacting Party Perma-
nencewith Electoral Proximity and Electoral Proximity Squared,
including the same demographic variables and survey weights
as previous models, and clustering standard errors at the
country level. We find that the interactions are significant (see
table 12 in app. 4). Figure 3 displays predicted probabilities
of partisanship over the electoral cycle when Party Presence
is 1 standard deviation below the sample mean (left panel)
Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of Partisanship Closeness over the Electoral Cycle
Cycle Start Cycle Midpoint Cycle End
Start to Midpoint
Change
Midpoint to End
Change
Nonpartisan .41 .47 .42 .06 2.05
CI .37, .44 .45, .49 .38, .46 .01, .12 2.11, 2.01
Not very close .13 .13 .13 .00 .00
CI .12, .15 .12, .15 .12, .15 2.03, .03 2.03, .03
Somewhat close .32 .29 .32 2.04 .03
CI .30, .35 .27, .31 .29, .34 2.01, 2.08 2.02, .07
Very close .14 .11 .13 2.03 .02
CI .13, .16 .10, .11 .11, .15 2.01, 2.06 .01, .05
Note. CI p confidence interval.
21. The DALP data set also provides the standard deviation of each
party rating. This rating has a mean value of .673, with a standard devi-
ation of .307 and a range of 0–2.12. We conduct a successful robustness
check dropping countries for which there is higher than 1 standard de-
viation disagreement across experts regarding the permanence of party
presence (see app. 4).
22. Observing party activities and offices in the local community may
affect one’s partisanship even if the party in question is not the party to
which one is attached.
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and 1 standard deviation above the sample mean (right panel).
Low permanence of party presence is associated with an
absolute partisanship fluctuation of 22.1 percentage points
over the cycle. By contrast, partisanship levels are quite stable
throughout the electoral cycle where the permanence of party
presence is high.23
Country-level moderators
We posit and test whether fluctuations in partisanship over
the electoral cycle are moderated by the following country-
level factors. Readers can find an expanded version of this
subsection in appendix 5 detailing thicker theoretical motiva-
tion, data sources and coding.24
1. Information about parties, party organizational struc-
tures, knowledge of institutions, and thereby vot-
ers’ attachments to parties, grow over time (Converse
1969). These more permanent, long-run partisan at-
tachments in older democracies may help mitigate
electoral cycle effects. We use the cumulative age of
democracy variable from the Political Institutions and
Political Events (PIPE) data set (Przeworski 2013)
logged to investigate this proposition.
2. Lower socioeconomic development may be associated
with greater fluctuations in partisanship over the
electoral cycle because: (a) the net benefit of political
participation around elections may be greater in low
income countries due to political clientelism, rein-
forcing partisanship at this time (Horowitz 2012;
Lindberg 2010); and (b) the contrast in the avail-
ability of political information via the mass me-
dia may be starker over the electoral cycle in low-
income arenas where the mass media infrastructure
is weaker (Horowitz 2012). We utilize the United
Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI) as a
measure.
3. Systems with compulsory voting may increase the
electoral cycle’s effect on partisanship by drawing
high numbers of people into politics at election time
who are otherwise politically disengaged. When vot-
ers are incentivized “exogenously” to vote, they have
been shown to become more informed and engaged
(Shineman 2013). We use the PIPE data set for an
indicator variable for compulsory voting.
4. Higher effective number of parties may lead to larger
fluctuations in partisanship because they lead to mo-
bilization more on club, rather than public, goods
(Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004), thereby inten-
sifying the stakes of partisan competition and per-
haps increasing electoral cycle fluctuations in par-
tisanship. The Varieties of Democracy (V-dem)
data set has a measure of the effective number of
parties.
5. The electoral cycle effect may be stronger in party-
centric electoral systems where voters are more likely
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of partisanship over the electoral cycle. Left, low permanence of Party Presence; right, high permanence of Party Presence.
On the x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle from the last election (0) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the predicted probability of
identifying as partisan.
23. Appendix 4 contains graphs of the marginal effect of the position
in the electoral cycle on the probability of partisanship at high and low
levels of party permanence.
24. Readers may make correlational rather than causal inferences,
given that some of the moderating variables may be endogenous, not to
the primary explanatory variable (electoral proximity), but to partisanship
(the dependent variable).
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to attach to parties rather than individual politicians
(Carey and Shugart 1995). To operationalize, we the
Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote (ESPV) data
set, which includes a variable ranking candidate cen-
tricity (Johnson and Wallack 2012).
6. Competitive electoral races may stimulate a higher
degree of fluctuations over the electoral cycle be-
cause they are known to entail increased mobili-
zation activities and lead citizens to learn more in-
formation about political candidates (Kam and Utych
2011). However, noncompetitive elections could rep-
resent focal points for opposition mobilization
or ruling party repression (as in electoral authori-
tarian regimes) and may thereby intensify partisan-
ship (Tucker 2007). We calculate the margin of vic-
tory by expanding the NELDA data set.
7. Voters have “short political memories” (Healy and
Lenz 2014), thus, it may be that the longer the elec-
toral cycle length, the greater the fluctuations in par-
tisanship over the cycle. We calculate cycle length
from our own data.
8. The quality of democracy, which we measure by
the V-dem Electoral Democracy Index, may affect
the magnitude of fluctuations in partisanship. When
democracy is lower quality, we may see smaller fluc-
tuations if citizens disengage over the entirety of the
cycle due to disenchantment with the process of
elections. On the other hand, when elections have
poor quality, it can represent a focal point of mo-
bilization (Little et al. 2015).
9. Older parties may yield more permanent attach-
ments that are less prone to short or medium term
fluctuations versus newer parties. We use the Data-
base of Political Institutions’ (Beck et al. 2001)
measure of average party age.
With these data, we undertake two main types of anal-
yses in appendix 5. First, we show results are robust to the
inclusion of these variables as simple “control” variables in
appendix table 14. Second, we interact these variables with
the electoral Proximity and Proximity Squared variables. We
caution that many moderators are either fixed at the coun-
try level or have limited variation over time within a country
during the study time period. Because the study has 86 coun-
tries, statistical power therefore becomes limited to detect ef-
fects, especially because the moderator must be interacted
twice. Thus, we urge the reader to view the results with a grain
of salt—that there may be small effects that exist that are not
statistically distinguishable from zero due to limitations of
statistical power.
In table 15 in appendix 5, we show that the only one of
these nine moderators for which statistical significance is
reached is the level of country development, as measured by
the UN’s HDI. Figure 4 depicts the predicted probability of
partisanship over the electoral cycle when HDI takes on a
value of 1 standard deviation above the mean (left panel) and
1 standard deviation below the mean (right panel). When
HDI is high, there is very little fluctuation in partisanship
over the electoral cycle. When HDI is low, the predicted prob-
ability of being partisan decreases by a little over 10 percent-
age points from the beginning of the cycle to the midpoint,
and increases just under 10 percentage points from the mid-
point to the end of the cycle. This finding is consistent with
our hypothesis that countries with lower levels of develop-
ment experience greater fluctuations in partisanship over the
electoral cycle.
Figure 4. Position in the electoral cycle on the predicted probability of partisanship with HDI high and low. The left panel is when HDI takes on a value of
1 standard deviation above the mean, and the right panel, 1 standard deviation below the mean. On the x-axis is the percentage through the electoral cycle
from the last election (0) to the next election (1). On the y-axis is the marginal effect of the position in the electoral cycle on identifying as partisan.
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Second-order elections
In the main analysis, we empirically focused on “first-order”
elections for the head of government and/or elected repre-
sentatives to national government. Many countries have
subnational or supranational “second-order” elections that
are important but less so than first-order elections. When
such second-order elections do not coincide with first-order
elections, they typically see subdued political activity by mo-
bilizing actors and engagement from citizens (e.g., Reif and
Schmitt 1980). However, second-order elections can none-
theless be important mobilizing events drawing citizens into
national level partisan competition (e.g., Bechtel 2012).
It could be that fluctuations exist between any elections
at all, including second-order elections. We might expect
fluctuations to be smaller when noncoinciding second-
order elections “qualify” as a voting event because off-cycle
second-order elections are less likely to be as mobilizing as
first-order elections. However, fluctuations may be larger
when we include second-order elections, given that they are
no longer “hidden” throughout the first-order cycle, poten-
tially buoying partisanship in between first-order elections. The
role of second-order elections may further depend on degree
to which second-order institutions are important enough
to induce partisan mobilization (Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar
2012).
We collected dates and expanded our data set to include
two forms of nation-wide second-order elections—supra-
national elections and subnational (regional and local) elec-
tions—that are not simultaneous to national elections in the
sample. The only countries with supranational elections are
European Union countries with European Parliament elec-
tions. To measure the power of subnational authorities, we
use Hooghe et al.’s (2016) Regional Authority Index (RAI)
data set and the V-dem data set. See appendix 6 for more
detail on the data, coding and statistical models.
Compared to the 12 percentage point total fluctuation in
partisanship over the electoral cycle when using only first-
order election dates, the magnitude of the effect of the elec-
toral cycle on partisanship when adding second-order elections
as qualifying elections is very similar. The total fluctuation in
partisanship over the electoral cycle when all second-order
elections are included is 13 percentage points, with only su-
pranational election dates added—9 percentage points, sub-
national election dates only—14 percentage points, and with
only those subnational election dates added from above
mean importance subnational bodies—15 percentage points.25
Taken together, these results indicate that second-order elec-
tions are important for partisanship, but that some second-
order elections (those regarding important subnational bod-
ies) are more important than others. This work thus joins
scholars emphasizing the importance of second-order elec-
tions for citizen political engagement (e.g., Bechtel 2012) and
is consistent with work emphasizing that the degree of in-
stitutional authority affects citizen engagement around its
elections (e.g., Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar 2012).
CONCLUSION
We discover a striking result: across 86 countries in the
Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa, partisanship fluctuates a
total of 12 percentage points over the national electoral cycle.
The magnitude of this effect rivals traditional determinants of
partisanship such as being male (6 percentage point increase),
educated above the country mean level (6 percentage point
increase), and age (4 percentage point increase for each de-
cade). We extend the analysis in three main ways. First, as an
observable implication of the theory, we find that where
parties are more permanently present throughout the elec-
toral cycle, partisanship fluctuates little, but where they are
only present around elections, we observe very strong elec-
toral cycle fluctuations in partisanship (22 percentage points).
Second, we analyze the importance of a range of country-level
factors that could potentially moderate electoral cycle fluc-
tuations. We demonstrate that fluctuations are larger in lower-
income countries. Last, when “second-order” (supranational
and subnational) elections are included alongside “first-order”
(national) elections, we show fluctuations to be slightly larger,
an effect driven by subnational elections for powerful sub-
national bodies.
That the electoral cycle affects partisanship, in addition to
“static” individual factors and country-level institutional fac-
tors, is an important advance in the study of partisanship.
While our theoretical expectations are motivated by existing
comparative political science research, this result also resonates
with lay knowledge of people and politics. Political events—
especially elections—can draw people in to take sides in par-
tisan camps. As a result, many people cite particularly striking
political events that activate their interest and attachment to
political parties. It is time to incorporate such dynamic events
into our study of partisanship and, more broadly, political
behavior and public opinion. Scholars of elite-level politics
25. With the logic that decentralization may mitigate the electoral
cycle effect since politics is continually “closer to the people,” we examine
whether the first-order electoral cycle is moderated by the mere existence
of powerful subnational bodies, finding it is not. We also examine whether
the existence of noncoinciding second-order elections moderate parti-
sanship fluctuations over the first-order election cycle, finding that the
first-order electoral cycle fluctuation is strong in settings with and without
off-cycle second-order elections, but the fluctuation is slightly stronger in
the latter.
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have long established that the electoral cycle governs such
outcomes as government expenditure (Golden and Min 2013)
and racial bias in US state death penalty executions (Kubik and
Moran 2003).
This article sets the stage for multiple avenues of future
research. First, future studies might attempt to conduct more
microlevel research over the electoral cycle that could disen-
tangle which features of election campaigns suggested in this
study—for example, the mass media, interest group activi-
ties—are the largest catalysts of partisanship, especially when
parties are not embedded locally over the electoral cycle.
Further, given the finding that being a copartisan with a
winning versus losing party affects citizen attitudes toward
democracy as a whole (Moehler and Lindberg 2009), one
could further examine how partisanship with the incumbent
versus opposition parties affects the ebb and flow of parti-
sanship.
Second, a strong relationship exists between partisanship
and political participation (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000;
Powell 1986), as well as political attitudes (Bartels 2002;
Gerber et al. 2010). The results of this article suggest that a
fruitful research agenda lies in investigating the effects of the
electoral cycle on patterns of political behaviors and attitudes.
While a large body of work on second-order (minor) elections
(e.g., European Parliament) emphasizes that their timing
during the first-order (major) electoral cycle increases the level
of citizens’ political engagement if clustered around the latter
(Reif and Schmitt 1980), scholars have yet to examine the
electoral cycle’s effect on yet other forms of political partic-
ipation (e.g., contacting representatives, political discussion,
demonstration) or attitudes (e.g., trust in government ac-
tors, support for democracy) save Michelitch (2013) study of
sub-Saharan Africa. Future research could also endeavor to
connect whether increases in partisanship at election time
are responsible for the increase in political violence (Dun-
ning 2011; Strauss and Taylor 2009) or interpartisan dis-
crimination in ostensibly nonpolitical economic activity (Mi-
chelitch 2015).
Last, the findings in this study are relevant to exist-
ing studies that compare levels of mass partisanship cross-
nationally, which is often taken to indicate party system
institutionalization (e.g., Dalton and Weldon 2007; Main-
waring and Zoco 2007) and democratic consolidation (e.g.,
Brader and Tucker 2001). Especially in the developing world
where electoral cycle fluctuations are strongest, comparative
researchers are reliant on “barometer” style public opinion
surveys occurring at variable points in time over the elec-
toral cycle given the absence of election studies timed (natu-
rally) at elections. What may appear to be cross-national
differences in levels of mass partisanship may be confounded
by the omitted variable of the countries’ relative position in
their electoral cycles (i.e., it appears that country A has higher
levels of partisanship than country B, but it is an artifact of
the upcoming election in A). Similarly, what might appear
to be upward or downward time trends in partisanship within
a country may be confounded by electoral cycle effects. If
possible, regular public opinion barometers could consider
keeping the timing of their public opinion surveys relatively
consistent during the electoral cycle so as to facilitate com-
parisons and analysis of mass partisanship levels and other
attitudinal or behavioral measures prone to electoral cycle
effects.
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